Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

Papers presented at an international conference held at the US Army War College, May 1986. Includes maps of: Advance through Philistia - Situation at 6 P.M. on 29 October 1917; Advance through Philistia - Situation at 6 P.M. on 31 October 1917; Gaza Offensive - Schematic Operational Plan; Gaza Offensive - Schematic Deception Plan; Turkish Estimate of the EEF's Order of Battle before the Third Gaza Offensive; Captured German Map of British Front Line and Rear Covered by German Aerial Photo Sorties before the Megiddo Campaign; British Dispositions as Shown by Enemy Intelligence Service; Megiddo, 1918 - Situation at Zero Hour, 19 September 1918; Convoys PQ 17 and QP 13, 3-6 July 1942; Japanese-controlled Area, March 1944; Allied Advance in New Guinea, January 1943-February 1944; Anticipated and Actual Allied Landings, April 1944. Papers presented at an international conference held at the US Army War College, April 1986. "First appeared in a Special Issue on Intelligence and Military Operations of the jouornal Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1990), published by Frank Cass & Co."--T.p. verso. Papers presented in four international conferences held at the US Army War College, from 1985 to 1988.

Intelligence and Military Operations - Part One: The US Civil War - Role of Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign, 1863 - Lee at Gettysburg: A general without intelligence -- Part Two: First World War -- Part Three: The Second World War.