As a result of the stalemate on the Western Front in 1914, Britain turned to a more traditional instrument of her power, namely the Royal Navy. In early 1915, the War Council settled on an attempt to knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war, which was duly follwed by naval attacks on the Dardanelles. Failing to achieve a breakthrough of the Allied fleet to Constantinople, the campaign evolved into full-scale amphibious assault on the heavily fortified and well-manned Gallipoli Peninsula. This new study focuses on the operational level of warfare and moves the conversation and narrative upward from the tactical and participant experiences, which dominate the contemporary literature, to an analysis of campaign design and command and control at the corps and army level in an effort to explain the unique dynamic of the Gallipoli campaign.

Includes maps of: Dardanelles and Straits; Carden's Plan to Force the Dardanelles; War Council Campaign Design, 13 MAR 1915; Strait Defences, 18 MAR 1915; Dardanelles and Approaches, 1915; Hamilton's Plan to seize Kilid Bahr; Ottoman Defences, 26 MAR 1915; Ottoman Defences, 25 APR 1915; Cape Helles Landings, 25 APR 1915; ANZAC Landings, 25 APR 1915; Cape Helles Front, mid-July 1915; Hamilton's Plan for the ANZAC Breakout; Suvla Bay Landings, 6 AUG 1915.

The strategic setting -- The opposing campaign plans -- The naval assault, 19 February-18 March 1915 -- Arms and men: institutions, organizations and command -- The amphibious assault, 19 March-30 April 1915 -- The Ottoman counter-offensives, 1 May-5 August 1915 -- The ANZAC breakout, 6-28 August 1915 -- The ending of the campaign, 29 August 1915-8 January 1916.