This study is a critical analysis of the unsatisfactory support provided the United States Army by the United States Air Force's Air Weather Service (AWS) from the 1960s through 1978. The opening chapter briefly reviews the problems AWS endured supporting the Eighth Army during the Korean War. Chapter 2 on Vietnam looks at the effects of weather and weather support on Army operations in combat. In particular to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 101st Airborne Division during the battles at Hue, Khe Sanh, and the A Shau Valley in the 1968 Test Offensive. Chapter 3 discusses the Army's Organization in the 1970s, and the structure AWS webbed together to support it. Chapter 4 delves into the manpower authorized and assigned AWS by the Air Staff to support the Army and the formal procedures used to determine manning levels. Chapter 5 analyzes the difficulties AWS faced with new meteorological and weather communications equipment in the 1960s and 1970s. Chapter 6 looks at the critical questions of life-sustaining TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) and MTOE (Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment) support to AWS's weather personnel by the Army units they served. Chapter 7 reviews the question of whether AWS support at the division level should be direct or indirect (remote). Chapter 8 and 9 critically investigate the Army's requirements for weather support and the topic of weather support doctrine and policy. Chapter 10 concludes that attitudes and assets were the reasons why problems in Army weather support persisted and why AWS support to the Army in Vietnam and the ensuing period through 1978 were inadequate.

ADA123284.