The fall of France in the early summer of 1940 astonished the world; it was swift and complete. In a matter of weeks, the Germans had smashed the French army, previously considered one of the world's best. Many explanations succeed the event. Among the more popular are French decadence, or reluctance to fight; German brilliance; and an over-reliance on the Maginot Line and the experiences of World War I. But here Colonel Doughty settles the claim: France's failure to formulate a modern doctrine and, consequently, a realistic strategy, was the main cause of her quick defeat. French weakness was not caused by neglect, Doughty shows; but the controlled and methodical battles France had prepared in the interwar years to fight were precisely the kind Germany intended to avoid. While the French military attempted to hold to the Maginot Line and advance into Belgium, the Germans sliced into their center and cut the army in pieces. The French army had formulated a doctrine, devised a strategy, organized and equipped its units, and trained its personnel for the wrong type of war. Lt. Col. Robert Allan Doughty is the first English-speaking historian to gain access to extensive primary materials in the French archives.

The framework of French doctrine -- An army of reservists -- The defense of the frontiers -- The legacy of the past -- Firepower and the methodical battle -- Institutions and doctrine -- The development of the tank -- The creation of large armored units -- Conclusion.