Post-conflict policy has only recently been considered by the defense community. However, in Panama in 1989-90, the United States was programmatically and structurally ill-equipped for the situation that followed the fighting. Missing was an integrated and interagency strategy to support short-term conflict resolution and long-term reconstruction. This study represents an attempt to preclude such a shortfall in the future. It presents a detailed assessment of contingency planning for and execution of post conflict reconstruction policy implemented by the Department of Defense and Panama following Operation Just Cause. Hopefully, it will provide a framework for analysis and planning that will be of value to those who prepare for the use of military capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction operations, whether this follows interventions, as in Fatima, or is a part of the aftermath of US involvement in peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Each of these situations will require close attention to the situation following conflict. --

The use of force in the aftermath of the Cold War -- Panama 1989 : the nature and consequences of Pretorian rule -- Contingency planning for restoration -- Just Cause and the breakdown of blind logic -- The military support group -- Assessment and evaluation -- Lessons learned and future relevance.