This paper discusses the extended period of low-intensity conflict that North Korea conducted against South Korea in the mid to late 1960s. This period of hostilities had its dramatic moments, such as the seizure of the USS Pueblo, but for the most part, the tactics consisted of propaganda, infiltration, assassination plots, and guerrilla warfare. Because the war in Vietnam overshadowed these developments, the "unfinished war" in Korea has largely been ignored by military officers studying the nature and demands of modern warfare. In this sense, the label "forgotten war," often applied to the conventional war of the early 1950s, is much more applicable to the conflict on the peninsula from 1966 to 1969. It describes in detail the vast range of military operations short of war that an adversary can employ against countries supported by the United States, and assesses how allied forces can adapt to the unexpected and devise countermeasures that, if not completely effective, can at least disrupt the designs of the adversary so he cannot obtain his primary objectives. Through the exemplary leadership of General Charles H. Bonesteel III, it demonstrates the importance of personality in warfare and the essential need for officers to recognize the dominance of political considerations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

Introduction -- The land of the morning calm -- Concrete actions -- A continuous nightmare -- Isolated provocations -- What went right -- Appendix 1: The second Korean conflict : a chronology of key events -- Appendix 2: U.S. forces, Korea, order of battle, 1 January 1968 -- Appendix 3: Annex 1, tactical disposition of Korean People's Army maneuver forces, 1 January 1968 ; Annex 2, tactical disposition of U.S. Eighth Army maneuver forces, 1 January 1968 -- Appendix 4: Significant U.S.-KPA firefights, November 1966-December 1969 -- Glossary.