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To change an army : General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British armored doctrine, 1927-1938

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The strategy and operations of any war can be understood only in the light of conditions of the ten or twenty years before its beginning. Technology, organization, doctrine, training, command and staff appointments-all the essential of action in war-are put in place and developed in peacetime. The testing experience of combat will bring about change, but prewar elements continue to affect many events throughout even the longest of conflicts. Though obvious, the need to study the antecedents of war is inadequately reflected in the literature. Military history in general tends to be a history of wars. The author here provides us with a valuable contribution to our understanding of the British Army in the interwar years and, by implication, of the Second World War. Burnett-Stuart's career, from his beginnings in 1895 as a second lieutenant in the Rifle Brigade to his retirement as a senior general in 1938, was one of exceptional interest, even if the very highest positions in the service eluded him. In 1926, after tours of duty in India, South Africa, Egypt, and on the Western Front and four years as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in the War Office, he was put in command of the 3rd Division, an appointment that included responsibility for the Experimental Mechanized Force. From this vantage point, and in subsequent senior commands, he recognized the need for substantial innovation in the army's equipment, organization, and training; but he also understood the institutional, financial, and social realities within which modernization had to proceed. His later career therefore afford an unusually broad perspective-neither that of the radical reformer nor that of the defender of the status quo-on the difficult development of mechanization and armored warfare in the army and on the course of British military policy in general. The author has written not only an enlightening analytic account of one individual and of the unique elements of his specific historical situation, but also a case study of a timeless problem of great contemporary as well as scholarly significance: How does a military organization, without losing cohesion and effectiveness, change to meet the constantly recurring challenges of the new?

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Summary Note

The strategy and operations of any war can be understood only in the light of conditions of the ten or twenty years before its beginning. Technology, organization, doctrine, training, command and staff appointments-all the essential of action in war-are put in place and developed in peacetime. The testing experience of combat will bring about change, but prewar elements continue to affect many events throughout even the longest of conflicts. Though obvious, the need to study the antecedents of war is inadequately reflected in the literature.  Military history in general tends to be a history of wars. The author here provides us with a valuable contribution to our understanding of the British Army in the interwar years and, by implication, of the Second World War. Burnett-Stuart's career, from his beginnings in 1895 as a second lieutenant in the Rifle Brigade to his retirement as a senior general in 1938, was one of exceptional interest, even if the very highest positions in the service eluded him. In 1926, after tours of duty in India, South Africa, Egypt, and on the Western Front and four years as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in the War Office, he was put in command of the 3rd Division, an appointment that included responsibility for the Experimental Mechanized Force. From this vantage point, and in subsequent senior commands, he recognized the need for substantial innovation in the army's equipment, organization, and training; but he also understood the institutional, financial, and social realities within which modernization had to proceed. His later career therefore afford an unusually broad perspective-neither that of the radical reformer nor that of the defender of the status quo-on the difficult development of mechanization and armored warfare in the army and on the course of British military policy in general. The author has written not only an enlightening analytic account of one individual and of the unique elements of his specific historical situation, but also a case study of a timeless problem of great contemporary as well as scholarly significance: How does a military organization, without losing cohesion and effectiveness, change to meet the constantly recurring challenges of the new?

General Note

Includes index.

Content Note

Introduction -- Prologue: British military reform, circa 1870-1925 -- The military education of John Burnett-Stuart -- The birth of the mechanized force, the death of the armored force, 1926-1928 -- Doctrine, debate, and the Depression, 1929-1933 -- Burnett-Stuart and mechanization in Egypt, 1931-1934 -- The quest for a mobile division, 1934-1938 -- Epilogue and conclusions / Appendixes. Synopsis of Burnett-Stuart's military career -- members of the Army Council, 1927-1938 -- Burnett-Stuart's letter to J.F.C. Fuller, 18 February 1927 -- Provision of army estimates for purchase and maintenance of animals and vehicles, 1927-1938 -- J.F.C. Fuller's new model division, 1919 -- B.H. Liddell Hart's new model division, 1922 -- Composition of the experimental mechanized force, 1927 -- Burnett-Stuart's recommended armored force, 1928 -- Lindsay's proposed mobile division, February 1934 -- Montgomery-Massingberd's proposed mobile division, December 1934 -- The mobile division, December 1937.