Air power has been the most potent weapon of destruction in modern warfare and yet its effectiveness is neither uniform nor assured. The rush of technology which has produced gargantuan B-52s capable of carrying thirty tons of ordnance and supersonic fighters equipped with laser-guided bombs has focused military doctrine and strategy on the quantity and lethality of airborne weapons. However, as America's frustrating experience with the air war against North Vietnam revealed, intense aerial attack may not achieve either military or political objectives in a limited war. Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars, only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. A faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time. Basing his findings on recently declassified documents from Presidential libraries and Air Force archives, as well as on interview with civilian and military decision-makers, the author argues to the contrary that the reliance on air power as the primary instrument, no matter how vast, could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. In particular, Clodfelter shows why Rolling Thunder, Lyndon Johnson's 1965-68 air war against the North, was a less effective political instrument than Richard Nixon's two Linebacker campaigns. Bombing "worked" in 1972 because it suited Nixon's limited political goals and the war's conventional nature at that time, whereas Rolling Thunder ignored Communist strategy and pursued broad, often conflicting aims. With the knowledge gleaned from his thorough analysis of the three American bombing campaigns against North Vietnam, Clodfelter established the critical importance of matching bombing objectives to national policy goals and calls for a major reassessment of our doctrine and strategy. He contends that strategic air power doctrine must be more sensitive to the full scope of political constraints and considerations than its advocates and official air force manuals have yet conceded. Underscoring Clausewitz's vision of war as "an extension of politics by other means," he offers an important reappraisal of our air war in Vietnam and a sobering message to our military leadership.

Includes index. SAMS Overflow books: some copies in course reserve A695 some copies in main the rest moved over to GIF Storeroom.

From unconditional surrender to flexible response -- The genesis of graduated thunder -- An extended application of force -- Restraints and results, 1965-1968 -- Nixon turns to air power -- Persuading enemy and ally: the Christmas bombings -- Epilogue.