This publication by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt contains a number of papers written by way of a contribution to the revival of operational thinking from the historical point of view. They were read for the first time at the 30th International Conference on Military History in Nuremberg in 1989 and are presented here in a revised and shortened version. The collection is based on three themes...The development of operational thinking in the German armed forces throughout approximately 100 years of military history...The gradual demise of operational thinking and action in the Second World War as a result of Hitler's increasing limitation of the discretion of his higher commanders, an irresponsible mission-capability gap with reference to personnel and matériel, as well as the completely benighted misjudgment of the entire political and military situation by the so-called 'Führer'...Finally, The operational concepts and principles of the Western Allies toward the end of the Second World War are examined.

In binder 23x17 cm.

Operational thinking in Schlieffen and Manstein /Günter Roth -- From Tobruk to El Alamein : the operational basisi of the decision in North Africa in the summer and fall of 1942 / Reinhard Stumpf -- The Ardennes Offensive in 1944 : Politico-strategic considerations and operational planning on the German side / Roland G. Foerster -- The operational basis of the Ardennes counteroffensive (Battle of the Bulge) : The German economy and logistics / Horst Rohde -- The Battle of the Bulge : defense against the German Ardennes Offensive : a case study of Anglo-American Operations in World War II.