"While the past half-century has seen no diminution in the valor and fighting skill of the U.S. military and its allies, the fact remains that our wars have become more protracted, with decisive results more elusive. With only two exceptions -- Panama and the Gulf War under the first President Bush -- our campaigns have taken on character of endless slogs without positive results. This analytical work takes a ground-up look at the problem in order to assess how our strategic objectives have recently become divorced from our true capability, or imperatives. The book presents a unique examination of the nature of insurgencies and the three major guerrilla wars the United States has fought in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. Political passions aside, it addressed in hard detail -- demographic, terrain, cultural issues, and pure distance -- which insurgencies across the globe can successfully be fought It applies the hard experience of the last five decades to address the issues of today. As such, it also provides a timely and meaningful discussion of America's current geopolitical position. It starts with the previously close-held casualty estimate for Iraq that The Dupuy Institute complied in 2004 for the U.S. Department of Defense. Going from the practical to the theoretical, it then discusses a construct for understanding insurgencies and the contexts in which they can be fought. It applies these principles to Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, assessing where the projection of U.S. power can enhance our position and where the expense of our forces merely weakens it. It presents an extensive analysis of insurgencies based upon a unique database of 83 post-World War II cases. The book explores what is important to combat and what is not important to resist in insurgencies. As such, it builds a body of knowledge based upon a half-century's worth of real-life data. In these pages, Christopher A. Lawrence, the President of The Dupuy Institute, provides an invaluable guide to how the U.S. can best project its vital power, while avoiding the missteps of the recent past."--Jacket.

Iraq casualty estimate -- Art and science of counterinsurgency warfare studies -- Acid test : predicting the present -- Force ratios really do matter -- Cause really is important -- Two together seem really important -- Other similar work -- Outside support and structure of insurgencies -- Rules of engagement and measurements of brutality -- Sanctuaries, border barriers and population resettlement -- Estimating insurgent force size -- Value of elections -- Influence of terrain on insurgencies -- Other issues -- Burden of war -- Model of insurgencies -- Other theorists -- Other side -- Withdrawal and war termination -- Relating a force ratio model to Iraq -- Relating a force ratio model to Afghanistan -- Relating a force ratio model to Vietnam -- Conclusions -- Where do we go from here? -- Tale of two books.