All participating militaries in the Afghan campaign have had to adapt to emerging operational imperatives, including military support to the civilian development effort, closer partnering with Afghan security forces, and greater military restraint. This book analyses these initiatives and their outcomes by focusing on the experiences of three groups of militaries -- those that have faced the most intense operational and strategic pressures, those that have operated under the greatest political and cultural constraints, and the Afghan National Army and the Taliban, who have been forced to adapt to very different sets of circumstances.

Introduction : military adaptation in war /Theo Farrell -- Great game and the quagmire : military adaptation in the British and Soviet wars in Afghanistan, 1839-1989 / Daniel Moran -- Into the great wadi : the United States and the war in Afghanistan / James A. Russell -- ISAF and NATO : campaign innovation and organizational adaptation / Sten Rynning -- Back from the brink : British military adaptation and the struggle for Helmand, 2006-2011 / Theo Farrell -- Military metier : second order adaptation and the Danish experience in Task Force Helmand / Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen -- Soft power, the hard way : adaptation by the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan / Martijn Kitzen, Sebastiaan Rietjens and Frans Osinga -- Mission command without a mission : German military adaptation in Afghanistan / Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe -- Canadian forces in Afghanistan : minority government and generational change while under fire / Stephen M. Saideman -- Military adaptation by the Taliban, 2001-2011 / Antonio Giustozzi -- Shoulder-to-shoulder fighting different wars : NATO advisors and military adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001-2011 / Adam Grissom -- Conclusion : military adaptation and the war in Afghanistan / Frans Osinga and James A. Russell.