"If U.S. military personnel still plan to win in Afghanistan, they better take a hard look at this book. Unhindered by any obligation toward 'political correctness,' its author has the perfect background for some helpful advice. That advice takes the form of an intelligence and tactical-technique supplement covering events as recent as June 2010. U.S. planners have yet to realize the power of the Taliban's grassroots approach. To do anything about it, they will have to allow the dispersal of U.S. troops into every town/neighborhood along Afghanistan's major highways. For, it is along those highways that the Taliban has been smuggling wherewithal in and drugs out. This has not been readily apparent, because the people have been moving in pairs, ordnance in pieces, and drugs in secret trucking compartments. This author is totally familiar with the Asians' bottom-up way of fighting and a recognized authority on squad tactics. He has traveled extensively in both Islamist and Communist worlds. The threat is not only to the Afghan regime, but also to that of its eastern neighbor. This book gives one of the most detailed accounts available of Pakistan's internal struggles. There is evidence of al-Qaeda helping Jamaat-i-Islami affiliates during the recent Swat Valley envelopment of Islamabad. Thus, opposition ties on both sides of the border are investigated. While far more humane, the current U.S. strategy is still too much like that of the Soviets to succeed. This region is so corrupt that no standard counterinsurgency plan will work. Its drug culture has first to be altered. Until that happens, every Afghan police/army detachment in built-up areas along major highways will have to be collocated with a few U.S. troops. That means allowing lone U.S. squads to operate outside of any artillery or airstrike umbrella. That's the only way to win in a year." Publisher's review

"Illustrated"

Part one:The full extent of the problem -- What lies behind all the Afghan turmoil? -- The Afghan Taliban's Karachi home -- The Pakistani Taliban's Islamabad offensive -- Al-Qaeda's hidden influence -- The drug barons -- Part two: Lessons from history -- Foreign destabilization of Afghanistan -- Unresolved issues within Pakistan -- Reasons behind the Soviet failure -- Still probable conduits and depots -- Part three: The martial part of a 4GW equation -- Changes in how the Taliban fights -- The drug runners; modus operandi -- Present U.S. strategy -- Drug interdiction tactics -- New techniques on offense -- New techniques on defense -- The village contingent option -- Epilogue.