Ever since October 1993 when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in the Battle of Mogadishu, America's political and military policymakers have been constrained by public reaction to the images of the bodies of U.S. casualties being dragged through streets full of jubilant Somalis. These images shocked and confounded the American people, who had been assured of the benign humanitarian aims of the UN operation to restore civil order in Somalia. The subsequent aversion of successive U.S. governments to intervene in failed and fragile states to stop humanitarian crises was given the sobriquet of "Somalia Syndrome." The author argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it was Somalia Syndrome, rather than the massive U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks, that fatefully altered the contours of the post-Cold War international security environment. The disastrous outcome of the raid to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid precipitated America's strategic retreat from its post-Cold War experiment at partnership with the UN in nation-building and peace enforcement and engendered U.S. paralysis in the face of genocides in Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia in 1995 and Dafur since 2003. The ensuing international security vacuum emboldened al Qaeda to emerge and attack America and ushered in our present era of intrastate conflict, state-sponsored eliminationism, mass killings, forced relocations and international terrorism. As the author's even-handed analysis shows, the Somali crisis was the harbinger and catalyst of seven key features that distinguish the profile of post-Cold War world security order. These include the facts that failed and fragile states are now the main source of world instability and that hot wars are now driven by racial, ethic and religious identity issues deliberately programmed and inflamed by tribal warlords, religious mystagogues and political autocrats.

1. The new global context and the disintegration of the Somali State -- 2. About face: President Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia -- 3. A shattered hope: The U.S. - UN Intervention in Somalia -- 4. What if? The alternative history of Australian involvement in Somalia -- 5. The Somalia syndrome and the rise of al Qaeda -- 6. Too little too late: Clinton's growing fears about al Qaeda and the long shadow of the Somalia syndrome -- 7. What threat? Bush's retreat to the Mogadishu line and the countdown to the 9/11 attacks -- 8. Conclusion: America's Strategic shortfall.