There is a consensus, captured by proponents of militarism theory, that militaries seek wars to enhance their institutional influence, and that they promote expansionist policies because it is in line with their training. However, most military-run states, and those regimes influenced by their militaries, termed militarized regimes, spend much of their time at peace. This book questions the underlying logic of the militarist explanation and seeks to propose a more tragic argument based on the distorting impact of military indoctrination and command practices on civil government institutions. The theory is applied to seven case studies of the periods leading up to the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars, the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab Israeli Wars, the 1969-75 Iran-Iraq border conflict, and the 1979 Iraqi invasion of Iran.

Introduction: contending views--Militarism, militarization and war -- Militarization and war -- Pakistan, direct militarization, and the 1965 war -- India, nonmilitarization, and the 1971 war -- Israel, civilian militarization, and the 1956 war -- Israel, embedded civilian militarization, and the 1967 war -- Egypt, elite militarization, and the 1973 war -- Iran, elite militarization, and the 1969-1975 conflict -- Iraq, undermilitarization, and the 1980 war -- Conclusion.