"Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C."

Saddam Hussein's "Powder Keg" --xvii -- America's Strategic Mistakes -- xx -- Importance of Creating Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces -- xxiv -- 1 Importance of the Initial Failures in Grand Strategy and Strategic Assessment: The Background to the Effort to Create Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces -- 1 -- "Turkish Question" -- 2 -- Warning Indicators before and after the Fall -- 4 -- Importance of Iraqi Public Opinion and Hostility and Distrust of Coalition Forces -- 5 -- "Disbanding" Iraqi Forces -- 10 -- "De-Ba'athification and De-Saddamization" of Iraqi Forces -- 12 -- Initial Ideological Approach to Creating Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces -- 15 -- Problems in the Culture of the U.S. Military -- 16 -- Failures at the U.S. Advisory and Civilian Assistance Level: The Problem of the Security Forces and Police -- 18 -- Problems in Governance and Iraq's Economy and Society -- 25 -- Iraqi View: Failure to Foresee Insurgency, Not Postwar Disbandment, Is the Key Problem -- 26 -- Legacy -- 27 -- 2 Growth and Character of the Insurgent Threat -- 29 -- Failing to Admit the Scope of the Problem through Mid-2004 -- 29 -- Evolving Threat Tactics and Pressure on Government Forces -- 30 -- Political, Psychological, and Information Warfare Lessons -- 32 -- Lessons about Methods of Attack and Combat -- 40 -- Iraqi-U.S. Asymmetric Interaction and Noninteroperability -- 49 -- 3 Coalition Training and Equipment Efforts: The Failures of 2003 -- 51 -- Planning for the Wrong Forces and the Wrong Mission -- 55 -- Providing the Equipment and Training Effort with Too Little, Too Late -- 57 -- Tilting toward Reality -- 61 -- 4 Failing to Deliver an Adequate Training and Equipment Program through the Tenure of the CPA and Mid-2004 -- 65 -- Period from June 2004 to the Fall of 2004 -- 67 -- Progress in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces -- 67 -- Progress at the Time the CPA Went Out of Business at the End of June 2004: The CPA View -- 69 -- Progress at the Time the CPA Went Out of Business at the End of June 2004: The GAO View -- 70 -- Too Little and Too Late in Getting Resources to the Iraqis -- 74 -- Force Status Data -- 75 -- Manpower and Training Status -- 76 -- Manning and Training Issues in Mid-2004 -- 83 -- Equipment Issues in Mid-2004 -- 84 -- Militia and Civilian Disarmament Issues -- 87 -- HUMINT Problem -- 91 -- 5 Fall of 2004: The Effort to Train Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces Slowly Begins to Gather Momentum -- 93 -- Creating More Effective Core Forces -- 94 -- Manning, Training, and Equipment of the Overall Mix of Iraqi Forces by Major Force Element -- 96 -- Equipment Holdings -- 99 -- Iraqi Minister of Defense Briefing-September 22, 2004 -- 100 -- Resources as of September and October -- 100 -- 6 Status of Iraqi Forces in November 2004 -- 103 -- Numbers of Active, Trained/Equipped/Authorized Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces as of Late November 2004 -- 104 -- On Duty versus Trained and Equipped -- 104 -- Lack of Meaningful Equipment Reporting -- 106 -- Key Iraqi Force Components -- 106 -- Continuing Problems in Training the Police Forces -- 109 -- 7 End of 2004 as a Benchmark: Trends in the Progress of Iraqi Security and Military Forces in December 2004 -- 117 -- Manning at the End of 2004: A Statistical "Snapshot" -- 117 -- Manning at the End of 2004: Force Trends -- 119 -- Equipment at the End of 2004 -- 128 -- Facilities at the End of 2004 -- 130 -- Spending at the End of 2004 -- 131 -- Operational Readiness at the End of 2004 -- 131 -- Progress in Other Areas -- 134 -- 8 Run Up to Elections: Iraqi Security and Military Forces in January 2005 -- 139 -- Manning in Levels in January 2005 -- 140 -- Equipment at the Beginning of 2005 -- 143 -- Facilities -- 145 -- Operational Readiness -- 146 -- Other Force Developments -- 147 -- 9 Iraqi Military and Security Forces in the Spring and Summer of 2005 -- 151 -- Manning Levels of Iraqi Military and Security Forces Following the Election -- 155 -- Equipment Levels -- 162 -- Vetting and Training -- 168 -- Force Developments -- 186 -- Operational Readiness -- 198 -- Issue of Financing -- 214 -- 10 Iraqi View of Iraq's Emerging Forces -- 219 -- Force Development Principles and Strategy -- 220 -- Developing Effective Ministries and "Governance" -- 221 -- Moving toward Iraqi Control of the Force Development Effort -- 222 -- Iraqi Intelligence -- 224 -- Manpower Issues Affecting Force Development -- 226 -- Creating an Effective Iraqi Training Structure -- 227 -- Iraqi View of Force Development -- 230 -- 11 Evolving Nature of the Insurgency and the Risk of Sectarian and Ethnic Conflict -- 237 -- An Unstable Mix of Threats -- 237 -- Uncertain Cycles and Patterns in the Insurgency -- 239 -- Limits to the Insurgency -- 247 -- Continuing Threat -- 249 -- Meaning of Coalition Victories and Insurgent Defeats -- 250 -- Dominant Role of Iraqi Sunni Arab Insurgents -- 252 -- Ba'athists, Ex-Regime Loyalists, and/or "Sunni Nationalists" -- 254 -- Islamist Groups and Outside Volunteers -- 261 -- Sunni Iraqi Nationalist versus Sunni Islamic Extremist, or De Facto Cooperation? -- 276 -- Uncertain Status of the Shi'ites -- 278 -- Kurds and Other Minorities -- 284 -- Role of Crime and Criminals -- 287 -- Problem of Syria -- 291 -- Problem of Iran -- 297 -- Problem of Turkey -- 300 -- Problem of Jordan -- 301 -- Iraqi Views of the Threat -- 302 -- Inclusion versus Conflict -- 303 -- Insurgency and the Effectiveness and Visibility of Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces -- 308 -- 12 Building the Future -- 315 -- Defining "Victory" and "Defeat" -- 316 -- Broader Context of Success: A Nation for Iraqis and by Iraqis -- 317 -- Creating Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces -- 320 -- Future Role of the United States and Coalition-and of U.S. and Coalition Forces -- 321 -- NATO, UN, and Regional Forces Are at Best a Temporary Expedient -- 324 -- Ongoing Changes in U.S. Force Development Strategy -- 328 -- "Tipping Years" versus "Tipping Points": Opportunities and Recommendations for Changes in U.S. Policy and Actions -- 341 -- Need for Focused Public Diplomacy -- 344 -- Need for Metrics, Credibility, and Transparency -- 346 -- Broader Lessons for U.S. Policy and Planning -- 350.