"Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough men and hardware, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of the development and failure of U.S. military policy in Vietnam from 1954-1973, career Army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. argues that precisely because of this mindset -- that more bombs, guns and troops could lead to victory -- the war was lost before the army had a chance to fight it." -- from the book jacket

Includes index.

Part I. The Advisory Years, 1954-1965 - Brushfires on a cold dawn - Revolution that failed - Into the Quagmire - Gearing up for Counterinsurgency -- Part II. Years of Intervention, 1965-1968 - Fourty-four Battalions across the Rubicon - A strategy of tactics - Counterinsurgency American style - The "Other War" -- Part III. Years of withdrawal, 1968-1973 - Tet: Defeat into Victory - Paths untaken, paths forsaken. Notes. Index.