An Inteligence contact code-named Ali. Congressman Weldon lets you know what the CIA doesn't want to know. You'll learn, straight from Ali's actual reports: Why Iran will decide the next terror strike on America; How a major planned terror strike was called off because the terrorist thought it would help President Bush politically; Why Iran, not Al-Qaeda, is the command post of radical Islamic terror; Who is really undercutting American efforts to create a peaceful, stabel Iraq; Why Iran is like the Soviet Union in the 80's: extremely dangerous, the iron glove behind all enemies - yet on the verge of internal collapse; The Iranian nuclear program: red-hot and more advanced than you think.

Includes index. Includes Dedication, Acknowledgements, Contents, Chapters 1 - 17, Appendixes 1 - 6 and Index.

2Ali Reports (22-25 April 2003): High Command of Terrorism, Nuclear Ambitions, Bin Laden in Iran, Assassination Plots -- 21 -- 3 Ali Reports (27-29 April 2003): North Korea, Subversion in Iraq and Afghanistan, CIA Shows No Interest -- 55 -- 4 Ali Reports (1-18 May 2003): Catastrophic Attack Against America, More on Subversion, British Government, French Policy -- 63 -- 5 Ali Reports (12-22 June 2003): Al Sadr Hosted, Uprising in Iran, CIA Still Shows No Interest -- 85 -- 6 Ali Reports (July-August 2003): 12th Imam Operation, "Anyone But Bush," Al Qaeda -- 91 -- 7 Ali Reports (4-27 September 2003): Al Zarqawi Hosted, Bin Laden Leaves Tehran, Deceiving the Europeans -- 97 -- 8 Ali Reports (11-30 October 2003): Further Details on the 12th Imam Operation, Nuclear Deception, the Plot to Assassinate President Bush, and Iraq -- 103 -- 9 Ali Reports (19 November 2003): 12th Imam Attack Postponed until after U.S. Election, More from Committee of Nine -- 113 -- 10 Ali Reports (21-29 January 2004): Iran Prepares for U.S. Election, Backs Democrats, CIA Meets with Ali, Still Shows No Interest -- 117 -- 11 Ali Reports (3-22 February 2004): Ali Confirmed, More from Inside Iran -- 121 -- 12 Ali Reports (17-25 March 2004): "Islamic Vatican" of Terrorism, Germany, Bin Laden in Iran -- 125 -- 13 Ali Reports (5-28 April 2004): 9/11 Commission, Al Qaeda, Al Sadr, Bribes to Al Jazeera -- 133 -- 14 Ali Reports (3-29 May 2004): Bin Laden in Iran, Al Zarqawi Lunches with Sepah and Al Qaeda, Terrorists Given a Free Hand -- 139 -- 15 Ali Reports (June-August 2004): Crash Effort to Develop Atomic Bomb, Ali Pleads for CIA Assistance -- 145 -- 16 Ali Report (23 September 2004): Destabilizing Iraq, North Korea Model Adopted, More on Known Terrorists -- 151 -- 17 Conclusions and Recommendations: Clinton Administration Intelligence Failures, 9/11 Commission and Congressional Intelligence Reforms, Our Intelligence Services Have Long Been Dysfunctional, Grand Strategy for Winning the War on Terrorism -- 157 -- Appendix 1 Recent Letter from Ali -- 201 -- Appendix 2 Memo: Ali a Credible Source -- 209 -- Appendix 3 Letter of April 28, 2003, Sent to CIA Director George Tenet, et al. -- 211 -- Appendix 4 Letter to CIA Director George Tenet, April 14, 2004 -- 215 -- Appendix 5 Letter to John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, on National Operations Analysis Hub (NOAH) July 30, 1999 -- 217 -- Appendix 6 U.S.-Russia Partnership -- 221.