Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances

Additional copies filed in the main collection.

Part I.Setting the Stage -- 1. How Armies Learn 3 -- 2. The Hard Lesson of Insurgency 15 -- 3. The British and American Armies: Separated by a Common Language 35 -- Part II. Malaya -- 4. British Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1951 59 -- 5. The Empire Strikes Back: British Army Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1952-1957 87 -- Part III. Vietnam -- 6. The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and Learning During the Advisory Years, 1950-1964 115 -- 7. The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and Learning During the Fighting Years, 1965-1972 151 -- Part IV. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam -- 8. Hard Lessons: The British and American Armies Learn Counterinsurgency 191 -- 9. Organizational Culture and Learning Institutions: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife 213.