From a Western perspective, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 largely fulfilled the first President Bush's objective : "In, out, do it, do it right, get gone. That's the message." But in the Arab world, the causes and consequences of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent defeat by a U.S.-led coalition were never so clear-cut. This book addresses three fundamental issues : how extensively and in what specific ways Iraq appealed to Islam during the Kuwait crisis; how elites, Islamists, and the elusive Arab "street," both in and out of the coalition, responded to that appeal and why they repsonded as they did; and the longer-term effects that resulted from Saddam's strategy. This investigation reveals a war that the West largely ignored in 1990-1991, one which divided Muslims and Arabs and gave rise to the volatile mix of Islam and nationalism that still remains a regional and global threat. -- From the publisher.

Historical background and inter-Arab politics prior to the invasion of Kuwait -- Historical background and inter-Arab politics after the invasion of Kuwait -- Iraq, deep culture, and the employment of Islam before the invasion of Kuwait -- Fi sabil Allah : Iraq and the employment of Islam in the invasion of Kuwait -- Islam and the region at war -- Reflections on jihad and the other gulf war -- Closing reflection : the view from the mountains.