What really went wrong in the covert American attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran? Until now, an objective, fully documented account of the 1980 operation, synthesizing all available information and offering a balanced analysis of events, has not been available. Author Paul B. Ryan avoids the sensationalism, limited time frame, and self-interest of earlier accounts to coolly and rationally investigate the reasons behind the failure. Decisions made each of the way by the White House, the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are closely examined and assessed for their value to the mission itself and, by implication, to all future special operations. Ryan, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a retired U.S. Navy captain, had no involvement in the planning or execution of the operation. He writes from the point of view of a trained historian and a widely experience naval officer. His account is carefully documented with notes, bibliography, maps, and photographs and illuminated with the perspective of one who is intimately familiar with the planning and the decision-making process in the Pentagon. Praised for the fairness of his earlier books, which also deal with controversial subjects, Ryan presents all the facts-within the limits imposed by security-to allow readers to judge for themselves his assessment of what went wrong and why. He provides varying points of view, including those of President Jimmy Carter, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, press secretary Hamilton Jordan, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, army commando leader Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, the hostages themselves, and the international and domestic press. He also presents, for the first time in detail, the findings of the review board, headed by Admiral James L. Holloway III, that officially investigated the ill-starred operation. Written for general readers as well as for those with a specific interest in diplomatic history and international affairs, the book uses a narrative format to track events. Starting with the capture of the American Embassy staff, it goes on to examine President Carter's controversial order to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan a covert rescue mission, the Joint Chiefs' approval of the plan despite a lack of readily available materiel and trained units, and the difficulties caused by a clouded chain of command. The perilous 600-mile flight of the eight helicopters to Desert One and the secret rendezvous in the Iranian desert is retraced, along with the disastrous events that followed, which stamped the endeavor with tragedy. Ryan concludes that the aborted mission exposed serious deficiencies in the military-political interface, and he offers proposals for change. He also shows how tactical lessons learned in the debacle were applied to the crises in Grenada and Beirut, and how they can be brought to bear on future covert operations. Until all official records are declassified, this book will stand as the most useful source available on the subject.

Includes index.

Background to a debacle -- Planning the assault -- Countdown to D-day -- The flight of the luckless helicopters -- The crash at Desert One -- A worldwide flareup -- The Holloway investigation -- The aftermath of the raid -- Desert One and other special operations -- Epilogue: proposals for change.