"In the spring of 2003, a stunned world watched the armed forces of America and Britain conduct a lightning-last military campaign against Iraq. Confounding predictions of failure, the Iraqi regime was dismantled, and much of the conventional wisdom about modern war was irrevocably altered. Yet as U.S. and British forces occupied Basra, Tikrit, and Mosul, the Iraqi nation slipped into anarchy - and the phrase "shock and awe" began to sound more appropriate as a description of the war's aftermath, rather than its opening." "Such has been the twisted trail of the Iraq War's dramatic events. But like so many other conflicts, the war ultimately seemed to pose more questions than it solved. This book is the first in-depth analysis of the second war against Saddam Hussein's regime. What are the repercussions of the pre-war political fights in Washington, Paris, and the UN? Was victory really due to the brilliance of Anglo-American arms, or had Saddam's regime simply been too degraded to fight? Why didn't Baghdad become a second Stalingrad? Why weren't the occupying forces prepared to impose order? And then there is the mother of all questions: Where are Iraq's weapons of mass destruction?" "Respected military analyst Anthony Cordesman incisively examines the key issues swirling around the most significant American war since Vietnam. Beginning the search for answers is essential to understanding America's awesome power and its place in a new age of international terror and regional conflict."--Jacket.

"Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C."

2Limits of Analysis: What We Don't Yet Know 7 -- 3 Forces Engaged 15 -- Changing and Uncertain Nature of Force Ratios 15 -- Iraq's Misuse of Its Force Strength during the Fighting 18 -- Failures in Iraqi Leadership 19 -- Impact of Seapower 20 -- Impact of Airpower 22 -- Size and Nature of the Coalition Air Component 24 -- Land-based Air Defenses 32 -- Iraqi and Coalition Land Forces 36 -- Problem of Future Force Ratios 52 -- 4 Course of the War and the Interaction of Joint Forces 57 -- Beginning of the Conflict: The Decapitation Strike and Initial Land Advance 58 -- Intensive Air Operations and Continuing Land Advances 62 -- Continuing Advance from the South 74 -- "Battle of Baghdad" 94 -- End of the Battle of Baghdad and Movement toward Tikrit 114 -- End of the Conflict and First Efforts at the Transition to Nation Building 125 -- No Clean Ending 144 -- 5 Three Debates: War Plan and Transformation, "Powell Doctrine" Versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine," and The "New Way of War" 149 -- War Plan Debate 149 -- Political Factors That Make the "War Plan" Debate Largely Moot 153 -- Problem of Not Knowing the Detailed History and Nature of the "War Plan" 153 -- "New Way of War" Debate 159 -- "Powell Doctrine" versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine" Debate 163 -- 6 Lessons About the Interaction Between Military Fundamentals and New Tactics and Technology 173 -- Value of Training, Readiness, and Human Factors 174 -- Competence, Adaptiveness, and Flexibility in War Planning 178 -- Synchronicity, Simultaneity, Speed, Jointness, and Combined Arms 180 -- Situational Awareness, Intelligence, and Command and Communications 183 -- Impact of Space Warfare 195 -- "Owning the Night" and "All-Weather Warfare" 202 -- Importance of Sustainability 203 -- Role of the Reserves 209 -- 7 Lessons Affecting the Overall Conduct of the War and Joint Forces 215 -- Land Power-Reinforced Air Power and Vice Versa 216 -- Increased Tempo of Operations: Shock and Awe versus Precision and Focus 218 -- Netcentric Warfare, IS&R Technology, Processing, Integration, and Near-Real-Time Information Flow and Targeting 219 -- Broader Picture: The Need to Restructure U.S. Command and Control Systems and the Possible Need to Restructure Theater Commands 221 -- Bandwidth 230 -- Asymmetric Warfare 231 -- Friendly Fire and Casualty Issues 238 -- Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System 240 -- Postwar Review of Force Plans, Basing, and Transformational Restocking 245 -- Broader Implications of Cutting Enemy Casualties and Collateral Damage: A New Dual Standard and Form of Asymmetric Warfare? 246 -- 8 Air, Missile, and Land-Based Air Defense Forces 253 -- Air Dominance 253 -- Effects-based Bombing: Fundamentally Changing the Effectiveness of Air Power While Limiting Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage 256 -- True Precision Air-Strike Capability 276 -- In-Flight and Rapid Targeting and Retargeting: Time-Sensitive Strikes 280 -- Stealth 283 -- Close Air Support 285 -- Urban Close Air Support: A Reality under the Right Conditions 285 -- Value of Expeditionary Air Power and Problems in Allied Readiness, Interoperability, and Modernization 287 -- Changes in Air Combat Packages 289 -- Hard-Target Kill Capabilities 290 -- Cruise Missiles 291 -- Use of Precision Air Munitions 294 -- Problem of Cluster Munitions 299 -- Bomber and the Advantage of Range-Payload 300 -- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 307 -- Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-10 316 -- Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-64 Apache and Other Attack Helicopters 317 -- U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier 333 -- U.S. Marine Corps V-22 Osprey 335 -- Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 335 -- Role of the Patriot 338 -- 9 Lessons Affecting Army Land Forces 349 -- Value of Main Battle Tanks and Heavy Firepower and Armor 351 -- "Precision Artillery" as a Partner to "Precision Air Power" 358 -- Special Forces as an Element of Joint Warfare 362 -- Urban Land Warfare 365 -- Research and Re-research on Local Weather and Operating Conditions 368 -- Problem of Allied Power Projection, Interoperability, and Allied War-Fighting Capability 368 -- 10 Lessons Affecting Marine Corps Land Forces 373 -- Marines: Both "Post-Amphibious" and "Post-Littoral" Forces 374 -- Detailed Lessons from Marine Forces: Friction and the Continuing Fog of War 375 -- Lessons from the Combat Assessment Team Report for the Marine Corps Systems Command 381 -- Lessons from Field Reporting from the 1st Marine Division 388 -- Marine Corps Artillery 393 -- Friendly Fire 394 -- Marine Corps Supply and Logistics 395 -- 11 Lessons Affecting Naval Forces 399 -- Aircraft Carriers 399 -- Jointness in Naval Air Operations 400 -- Jointness in C3, IS&R, and "Open Architecture" 401 -- Cruise Missile Ships 401 -- Mine Warfare and Naval Raids 401 -- Value of Sealift and Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships 402 -- Value of Allies 403 -- 12 Lessons Relating to Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction 405 -- Intelligence Strengths and Weaknesses 405 -- Need for Better Assessment, Characterization, and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key Delivery Systems 407 -- Politics of Characterizing and Targeting Iraqi WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems 431 -- Need for Rapid and Reliable Characterization of Chemical and Biological Agents and the Coalition Intelligence Effort 447 -- Organized Searches for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Proliferating Countries: The Search during and after the War 450 -- Lessons for the Future 455 -- 13 Other Lessons 471 -- Role of Women in Combat 471 -- Military Medical Facilities and Capabilities 471 -- Safety--Becoming More Critical 472 -- 14 Lessons from Iraqi Problems and Shortcomings 475 -- Iraq Really Was a Tyranny 476 -- Iraq Had Rival Politicized, Bureaucratic, and Compartmentalized Forces 476 -- Wasting the Best Forces Wastes All the Forces 479 -- Problem of Sanctions and Equipment Modernization 481 -- Iraqi Wartime Preparations Emphasized the Wrong Ideology and Type of Psychological Operations 482 -- Iraqi Command and Control: A Blind Force as Well as One without a Brain 483 -- Iraqi Irregular Warfare Tactics: Unexpected but More an Irritant Than Effective 483 -- Iraq Failed to Use Its Weapons of Mass Destruction If It Had Them 484 -- Other Failures 485 -- 15 Lessons Regarding the Value of Allies and Build-Up Time 487 -- Allies and Interoperability 487 -- Value of Regional Allies 490 -- Value of Rebuilding Alliances 491 -- 16 Military Lessons Relating to Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building 493 -- Impact of Limited Military Resources 494 -- Avoidable Problems 496 -- A Failure of U.S. Leadership and Organization 504 -- Inability of the U.S. Military to Properly Conceptualize and Understand Grand Strategy 506 -- There Is No "New Way of War" without Successful Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building 508 -- Intelligence on Conflict Termination and Nation Building 509 -- Lessons Relating to Political, Diplomatic, and Psychological Warfare 511 -- Overall Importance of Conflict Termination as a Critical Part of War Fighting 515 -- 17 Grand Strategy: the Civilian Aspects of Nation Building and the Challenge of Winning the Peace 517 -- Short-Term Challenges and the Risk of Guerrilla War 517 -- Nation Building versus Guerrilla Warfare: Best, Worst, and Probable Cases 519 -- Lessons for Near-Term Action 524 -- Medium-Term and Longer-Term Challenges in Nation Building 527 -- Fracture Lines in the Postwar Infrastructure 529 -- Political Fracture Lines 536 -- Demographic Fracture Lines 542 -- Economic Fracture Lines 542 -- Energy and Oil Export Fracture Lines 544 -- Transparency and Conspiracy Theories 551 -- New Fracture Lines Caused by Disarmament and the Need to Rebuild Iraqi Military Forces 551 -- Lessons for Peacemaking and Nation Building 555 -- 18 Grand Strategy: the Outcome of the Iraq War and the New Old Middle East 559 -- An Example of What? 559 -- Israel and the Second Intifada 561 -- Iran 562 -- Syria 563 -- Turkey 564 -- Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States 565 -- Jordan 566 -- Egypt 567 -- North Africa 567 -- Islamic Extremism and Terrorism 568 -- U.S. Role and Presence in the Region 568 -- Energy Imports and Energy Security 569 -- Underlying Factors That Shape the New Old Middle East 570. List of tables and maps -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The limits of analysis : what we don't yet know -- 3. The forces engaged -- 4. The course of the war and the interaction of joint forces -- 5. Three debates : war plan and transformation, "Powell doctrine" versus "Rumsfeld doctrine," and the "new way of war" -- 6. Lessons about the interaction between military fundamentals and new tactics and technology -- 7. Lessons affecting the overall conduct of the war and joint forces -- 8. Air, missile, and land-based air defense forces -- 9. Lessons affecting army land forces -- 10. Lessons affecting marine corps land forces -- 11. Lessons affecting naval forces -- 12. Lessons relating to intelligence and weapons of mass destruction -- 13. Other lessons -- 14. Lessons from Iraqi problems and shortcomings -- 15. Lessons regarding the value of allies and build-up time -- 16. Military lessons relating to conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building -- 17. Grand strategy : the civilian aspects of nation building and the challenge of winning the peace -- 18. Grand strategy: the outcome of the Iraq War and the new old Middle East -- About the author.