In 1979, a multidisciplinary research group at the Naval Postgraduate School began a joint investigation of deception. The group's intent was to illuminate the nature of deception, its processes, and factors that condition when one resorts to and succeeds at deception. In order to narrow the focus and facilitate access to relatively concrete historical data, the group oriented its efforts to the study of strategic military deceptions. This volume represents an effort to go beyond the typical single case history of deception based on anecdote and to launch a more theoretical approach to this problem.

Part I:Theoretical Perspectives --|t Propositions on Military Deception /|r Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig --|t Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception /|r Richards J. Heuer, Jr. --|t The Organizational Approach to Strategic Deception: Implications for Theory and Policy /|r Ronald G. Sherwin --|t Deception Within a Communications Theory Framework /|r William Reese --|t Deception in a Game Theoretic Framework /|r William Reese --|t A Systems View of Deception /|r Paul H. Moose --|t Prolegomenon to a Theory of Counterdeception /|r Theodore R. Sarbin --|g part II: Deception as Practiced --|t Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases /|r Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whaley --|t Barbarossa" German Grand Deception and the Achievement of Strategic and Tactical Surprise Against the Soviet Union, 1940-1941 /|r Russel H.S. Stolfi --|t An Eyewitness Report of the Fortitude Deception: Editorial Introduction to R.F. Hesketh's Manuscript /|r Barry D. Hunt --|t Excerpt from Fortitude: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe, April 1943 to May 1945 /|r Roger Fleetwood Hesketh --|t Stalingrad and Belorussia: Soviet Deception in World War II /|r Earl F. Ziemke --|t Strategic Deception in the Chinese War /|r Harlan W. Jencks --|t The Theory and Practice of Chinese Military Deception /|r Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow --|t Deception and the 1973 Middle East War /|r John Amos --|t Soviet Views of Deception and Strategic Surprise: The Invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan /|r Jiri Valenta --|g part III: Conclusion --|t Deception in Theory and Practice /|r Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig.