"Using information from newly translated Communist Vietnamese documents, combined with existing Western sources, Captain Ford explains and documents the actual significance of the offensive, which proves to be very different from that previously understood in America and the West."--BOOK JACKET. "The Vietnamese version of Tet reveals that while US forces achieved a tactical victory in the surprise battle, US intelligence misinterpreted the Communists' strategic intentions. For the North Vietnamese, a 'decisive victory' occurs when a superior force can be defeated not by military means but through external political or diplomatic developments that decide the outcome."--BOOK JACKET. "The North Vietnamese realized that, with the 1968 presidential elections approaching and world opinion in their favour, they would be able to demonstrate the legitimacy of their struggle and to convince the American public and policy-makers that a military victory would not be worth the cost. Their 'decisive victory' would be achieved with little risk."--BOOK JACKET. "Fundamentally, the Communists understood twenty-seven years ago the political and diplomatic nature of people's war, which many in the US military still find hard to comprehend. This book illustrates what the Americans missed and why they missed it."--Jacket.

Includes maps of: North and South Vietnam, Showing Corps Tactical Zones; Communist Administrative Divisions; South Vietnamese Provincial and Corps Boundaries; I Corps and the Route 9/Tri Thien-Hue Theater; COSVN, NLF, and PRG Headquarters; Realignment of Military Region 4; Border Battles; Principal Theaters and Targets for TCK/TKN.

Introduction: Why Tet is important -- What we missed -- The Vietnamese conclusion to People's War -- Reinforcing the South and the arrival of the Americans -- The search for a strategy -- Not with guns alone: fighting while negotiating -- The decision -- The 1967-68 winter-spring campaign: phase I -- Tet Mau Than: the 1968 Tet offensive -- Why we missed it -- Divided we fell -- Synthesis lost -- Annex 1: 1967 political reorientation -- Annex 2: Quang Tin document -- Annex 3: Excerpts from 1988 article -- Annex 4: Excerpts from 8 December 1967 cable from CIA's Saigon Station to Washington.