This paper presents a descriptive methodology for analyzing military missions. More specifically, it identifies shortcomings of U.S. doctrine relating to the establishment of criteria for measuring operational success on the battlefield. The author explores the 19th century principles associated with Clausewitzian theory and offers a method for dealing with the theoretical concepts of the Principle of Continuity and the Principle of Culmination. He explores the Clausewitzian contradictory nature of war and concludes that regardless of the revolution in technology and the changing face of battle, the Clausewitzian theories are still practical today.

"September 1997"--Cover. Not available electronically.

Introduction -- The theoretical point of culmination -- Filling a void -- What is lacking in our current understanding of battle? -- The contradictory nature of war -- Establishing measurable criteria -- A method for planning instead of sensing -- Historical models involving the point of culmination -- The precise nature of establishing criteria -- Paralleling objectives -- Contradicting the contradictory nature of war -- Conclusion.