A timely study of applicable military and civil lessons that emerge from historical small wars, and the overlooked role that combat officers play in creating operational and strategic doctrine from those lessons. Keith B. Bickel challenges a host of military and strategic theories that treat particular bureaucratic structures, large organizations, and elites as the progenitors of doctrine. This timely study of how the military draws lessons from interventions focuses on the overlooked role that mid-level combat officers play in creating military doctrine. "Mars Learning" closely evaluates Marine civil and military pacification operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and illuminates the debates surrounding the development of Marine Corps' small wars doctrine between 1915 and 1940. The result is compelling evidence of how field experience obtained before 1940 played a role in shaping the Marine Corps' "Small Wars Manual" and elements of doctrine that exist today. How the Marines organized lessons at that time provides important insights into how doctrine is likely to be generated today in response to post-Cold War interventions around the globe.

Includes maps of: Haiti; Division of Haiti into Districts; Dominican Republic; First Attacks and District Delineations in the Dominican Republic; Cordon Operations in the Dominican Republic; Nicaragua; Sandino's Major Areas of Operations.

Terms of art -- Historical and institutional context for small wars learning -- Intervention in Haiti and lessons learned -- Interventions in the Dominican Republic and lessons learned -- Intervention in Nicaragua and lessons learned -- From Nicaragua to the "Small Wars Manual" -- Concluding thoughts.