The ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan represents a solid test of their reset in relations. The author provides the historical background to the Afghanistan Question and assesses current events in the Afghan war with three objectives in mind: 1) To determine whether Russian-American cooperation in Afghanistan has been successful; 2) To identify and evaluate the successes and failures of the counterinsurgency strategy as the transition from U.S. to Afghanistan authority gains traction in the 2011-14 time frame; and 3) To provide conclusions and recommendations bearing on developments in Afghanistan.

"October 2011"--T.p. "October 2011."

Summary / Introduction / The American skeptics -- Russian skeptics -- The American rationale -- The Russian rationale -- The study's objectives / Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The decision to invade -- Escalation -- Bringing the Red Army home -- What was happening? -- The U.S. reaction -- The end / The failure to create a stable post-Soviet government and civil war. The United Nations proposal -- Why the proposal failed -- Washington's and Moscow's failure / The Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The origins of the Taliban -- Osama bin Laden -- The United States acknowledges bin Laden as a threat / 9/11 and war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The September 2001 terrorist attacks -- Routing the jihadists -- The Karzai government -- Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda: an assessment -- A partial victory / Three scenarios. The existing situation or plan A : an unstable but viable Afghanistan through COIN -- The insurgency -- The Karzai government -- Security forces -- The civilian-economic component -- Declining support for the war within the United States -- Pakistan -- Plan B: partition -- A Taliban victory -- The global jihadists prevail -- The Taliban return to power with a national agenda / The Russian response -- Countering Afghan narcotics -- The struggle over Manas -- The northern distribution network -- Central Asia and the North Caucasus / Concluding remarks and recommendations. Identifying the enemy: a civil war within Islam -- Making room for the rest -- The American malaise -- Sticking to the 2014 Afghanistan exit schedule -- Preparing for Bonn II -- Plan B: partition -- Preparing for the worst case scenario (Plan C): a Taliban victory -- Confronting Pakistan -- The time has come to reduce our profile in the Middle East -- Sustaining and enlarging security cooperation with Russia.