Drawing on an unusual combination of talents -- formal academic training in philosophy and a distinguished combat record as a Vietnam-era pilot -- the author plunges into an analysis of friction, or the tendency for things to go wrong in battle. In the opinion of Clausewitz, friction is one of the most important features of war, and the author agrees. Drawing on recent military history as well as philosophy and physiology, he makes a case that friction will continue to dominate war, no matter how brilliant the munitions or how extensive the net of sensors that guide them. He also examines the possibility that technological advances in the means of combat would produce transformation in the fundamental nature of future war. Discusses predictions that changes would include great reductions in, or elimination of, various impediments to timely & effective action in war. The primary question is whether Clausewitzian friction would succumb to future changes in warfare, or whether such impediments reflect more enduring aspects of war that technology can but marginally affect.

"August 2004"--T.p.

Preface to the revised edition -- Preface to the first edition -- The once and future problem -- Development of the unified concept -- Clarity about war as it actually is -- The mature Clausewitzian concept -- Friction and "Desert Storm" -- The intractability of strategic surprise -- Dispersed information -- Evolutionary biology as an exemplar -- Situation awareness in air-to-air combat -- Nonlinearity and a modern taxonomy -- Implications for future war.