This monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.

"September 2009."

Introduction / Part 1. The concept of intrawar deterrence / Part 2. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Background -- The Egyptian/Syrian decision to initiate war and the efforts to control escalation -- The course of the fighting and the Israeli struggle to define military options -- The challenge to Israeli decision-makers and the potential for Israel to escalate the war -- Additional military developments influencing Israeli decision-making and Israeli conventional strikes against Syrian strategic targets -- The turning of the tide and the potential for Arab and Soviet escalation of the war -- Egyptian attempts to contain Israeli military gains and the 1973 Scud launches / Part 3. The 1991 Iraq War. Deterrence and escalation control -- Iraq's initial efforts to assess the danger posed by the United States -- Iraqi chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear capabilities in 1990 -- Iraqi efforts to deter a U.S. and coalition attack without withdrawing from Kuwait -- Efforts to deter Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction before and during the conflict -- Iraqi efforts to deter U.S.-led regime change / Part 4. Conclusion: Lessons from other conflicts -- Endnotes