"The evolution of the Russian elite's view of Iran is traced over the past 20 years of post-Soviet history. The major thesis and outcome are as follows. 1. During most of the lat Soviet and post-Soviet period, two major trends in the approach to Iran have dominated the Russian elite. The first emphasizes the strategic importance of Russian's rapprochement with Iran and is mostly supported by Russian Imperial Nationalists, notably those defined as 'Eurasianists.' For these groups, an Iran-Russia rapprochement would not be a temporary use of Iran as a bargaining chip in dealing with the West, but a permanent alliance. The second group believes that Russia should use Iran as a bargaining chip in dealing with the United States and as a useful trade partner, but not a permanent ally. Supporters of this view usually see Russia either as a self-contained country or as close to the West, mostly Europe. 2. Eurasianism and similar brands of Russian nationalism became popular starting the early Soviet era, reaching a peak by the beginning of the Vladimir Putin era. By then, elements of Eurasianism had been integrated into the ideology of the upper echelon of the elite, including Putin. Thoughts about a possible, at least loose, strategic alliance with Iran were also becoming popular. Yet soon after the beginning of Putin's tenure, an opposite trend started to develop, and skepticism toward Iran and its relationship with Russia grew. This trend has dominated the Russian elite's approach to Iran to the present, regardless of the vacillation in Russian foreign policy. One might assume this would dominate the elite's view at least for the near future. 3. The changes in the Russian elite's approach to Iran-from the assumption that Iran should be a strategic ally to a more guarded view- are due not some much to changes in the international situation as to internal changes in Russia. The more guarded approach to Iran reflects increasing internal tension between ethnic Russians, still the majority of the Russian elite, and the Russian Islamic community. The persistence and likely increase of this tension is one of the most important reasons why a Russian/Iranian relationship would be guarded and pragmatic, barring some unforeseeable turns of events." Publisher's description.

"September 2009."

Foreword / Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. -- Summary -- Introduction -- The birth of the Eurasian model -- Integration of Iran in Eurasianism / Nationalistic discourse and germination of the idea of a Russian / Iranian axis -- Late Yeltsin era: increasing popularity of Eurasianism and plan for a Russian / Iranian axis -- The NATO / Serbian War and the foundation for Putin's early geopolitical posture -- The beginning of Putin's tenure and the pick of the dreams of an Iranian / Russian axis -- Muslim challenge -- The new Russian Nationalism and the new vision of Muslims: implications for the Iranian image -- Russia's Israel rapprochement as a sign of anti-Iranian policy -- Georgian War -- Recent developments