Competitive authoritarianism-regimes that combine competitive elections with serious violation of democratic procedure-proliferated in the post-Cold War era. This book explains the rise and diverging fate of competitive authoritarian regimes since 1990. Based on a comparative study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and post-communist Eurasia, the book finds that extensive ties to the West led to democratization. By raising the external cost of abuse, linkage to the West brought democracy even where domestic conditions were unfavorable. Where such ties were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker. Regime outcomes in these cases hinged on the character of state and ruling-party organizations. Where incumbents possessed robust coercive and party structures, competitive authoritarian regimes were durable; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.

Part I. Introduction and theory. Introduction -- Explaining competitive authoritarian regime trajectories: international linkage and the organizational power of incumbents / Part II. High linkage and democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas. Linkage, leverage, and democratization in Eastern Europe -- Linkage, leverage, and democratization in the Americas / Part III. The dynamics of competitive authoritarianism in low-linkage regions: the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia. The evolution of post-Soviet competitive authoritarianism -- Africa: transitions without democratization -- Diverging outcomes in Asia -- Conclusion / Appendix I: measuring competitive authoritarianism and authoritarian stability -- Appendix II: measuring leverage -- Appendix III: measuring linkage -- Appendix IV: measuring organizational power.