The current U.S. national military strategy is contingent on maintaining an unchallenged aerial power projection capability. It is difficult to conceive of an enemy in the near future with the ability to seriously challenge our aerial platforms while they are airborne. But what if our adversaries focus their attention on destroying our forward-based aircraft while they are on the ground? This paper postulates that the consequences of successful enemy standoff attacks on our air bases could affect not only the tactical situation but the strategic outcome as well, as the national will is negatively influenced by low-risk, high-payoff enemy (level II) standoff attacks. The paper traces the fundamental historical shift in air-base ground attacks from penetrating to standoff attacks and explains why technology will accelerate this trend. It also identifies the Army National Guard's divisional "medium" brigades as one possible force option to be assigned the joint rear-area defense and air-base ground defense missions.

"September 1996"--Cover. Not available electronically.

Introduction -- Terms defined -- Historical review -- The fundamental shift from penetrating to standoff attacks -- Identifying the standoff zone -- The consequences of ignoring the ABGD mission? -- The role of host nation forces -- If not host nation forces, then who? -- The politics of using Army National Guard units -- What force structure package should be assigned the ABGD mission? -- Let's get specific -- Is there another option? -- An historic agreement -- The need for continued Army involvement in the ABGD training mission -- The need for a renewed Air Force commitment -- Back to the future -- Conclusion.