A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory - the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.

Compact disc.

Elements of a theory of strategy. The retarded science of international strategy -- An essay on bargaining -- Bargaining, communication, and limited war -- II: A reorientation of game theory. Toward a theory of interdependent decision -- Enforcement, communication, and strategic moves -- Game theory and experimental research -- III: Strategy with a random ingredient. Randomization of promises and threats -- The threat that leaves something to chance -- IV: Surprise attack : a study in mutual distrust. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack -- Surprise attack and disarmament -- Appendices: Nuclear weapons and limited war ; For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory ; Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "noncooperative" games.