This study seeks to provide an initial assessment of the war in Afghanistan and the lessons to be drawn in terms of war fighting, intelligence, and force transformation. The Afghan conflict is anything but a conventional war: it is asymmetric warfare fought by different sides with different goals and perceptions using radically different methods-and fought as a theater battle in a broader global struggle against terrorism. Asymmetric wars tend to be highly adaptive, and this war is both regional and global in scope. It is also a struggle fought in a context where it may come to interact with other conflicts such as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian struggle and a possible US effort to drive Saddam Hussein from power.

Introduction -- The prelude to the conflict: the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Al Qaida, and the Taliban -- Shaping the battlefield: a unique war with unique intangibles -- The "conventional phase" of the conflict: drawing lessons without hard data -- Drawing lessons from the "conventional phase" of the conflict: driving the Taliban and Al Qaida from power -- The force transformation impact of the "conventional phase" of the war -- Drawing lessons about asymmetric warfare from ongoing low intensity conflict -- Drawing lessons about counterterrorism from ongoing low intensity conflict -- Conflict termination, nation building, grand strategy, and the aftermath of military victory.