In 1954, Samuel P. Huntington reconsidered the classic strategies of naval warfare and urged the U.S. Navy to focus upon sea based support of land power generation (Seabasing), since it lacked a peer competitor on the high seas in the wake of World War II. Yet, over 50 years later, the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense are still struggling to clearly define Seabasing and overcome an array of difficulties that have stifled its development. This study defines Seabasing and its relevance to the classic strategies of sea power as well as the current National Security Strategies and Joint Military Doctrine of the United States. Seabasing has become increasingly essential to land power generation due to the decreasing number of nations willing to grant the U.S. overseas bases. Finally, this study discusses the challenges that have slowed development of Seabasing and concludes that Seabasing can only be developed efficiently and effectively if progressed in a truly joint and organized fashion. At stake is the ability of the U.S. to deter aggression and reinforce its foreign policy with credible and timely threats to potential adversaries and offers of assistance to allies located throughout the world.

"06 May 2009"--Page [i].

Definition of seabasing -- Definition of the anti-access problem -- Relationship of seabasing to the classic strategies of Mahan and Corbett -- Relationship of seabasing to the national security strategies of the U.S. -- Relationship of seabasing to joint doctrine and coalition warfare -- Importance of seabasing to the land power generation of joint components -- Recent examples of seabasing -- Seabasing challenges -- Conclusions.