Years after the end of World War II, many of the important battles of the Eastern Front have not been thoroughly researched by Western military historians. Major James F. Gebhardt, a Soviet foreign area officer, describes a battle that has remained virtually unknown in the English-speaking world. The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation has remained obscure partly because it was fought on the far northern flank of the Soviet-German front-away from major centers of population, industry, or government. The German and Soviet generals who fought this battle are also not as well known to the American officer corps as the more famous and fashionable Guderian, Rommel, Manstein, or Zhukov. In Western general histories of the Soviet-German war, this operation normally receives one or two sentences and a single, minuscule map arrow-if it is mentioned at all. The comprehensive accounts of the battle that do exist are principally in Russian-language sources and, therefore, are inaccessible to most Western readers. Primarily using Soviet sources, Major Gebhardt has written a comprehensive study of the 1944 Soviet offensive conducted to clear German forces from the approaches to Murmansk. Its focus is at the operational level of war, with emphasis on the peculiar demands of arctic terrain on commanders and soldiers. Major Gebhardt also used German war diary reports to add clarity and perspective to the Soviet accounts. Leavenworth Paper No. 17 contains something for almost every reader. It describes the employment on arctic terrain of light infantry, infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, logistic support, air power, naval infantry (Soviet marines), amphibious forces, and special-purpose forces. In three weeks of often intense fighting, supported by units of the Northern Fleet, the Red Army inflicted significant personnel and materiel losses on the German force and drove it from Soviet and northern Norwegian territory. This operational account provides the U.S. Army with the opportunity to review the lessons the Soviets have drawn from this arctic battle. It enables leaders at all levels to view the problems of arctic warfare from their own perspective and arrive at their own conclusions. .

Strategic and operational setting. Strategic situation -- Weather and terrain -- German defensive disposition -- Soviet planning and preparation / The battle, phase one, 7-15 October 1944 / The battle, phase two, 18-22 October 1944 / The battle, phase three, 23 October-1 November 1944. Attack on Kirkenes -- Southward pursuit / Northern fleet support of ground operations. Command relationship -- Preparation -- Amphibious landings -- Naval air operations -- Naval support of army logistic operations / Soviet special operations. Karelian front special-purpose forces -- Naval special operations / Conclusions. Strategic and operational planning -- Soviet command and control -- Combat forces -- Combat support operations -- Conclusion.