Most American and Pakistani political and military leaders agree that without a credible U.S.-Pakistan partnership, victory against Taliban and Al Qaeda is impossible. For such a partnership, shared goals must be matched by shared threats, and perceptions must follow demonstrable action. Washington and Islamabad agree that Al Qaeda must be defeated. Pakistan's national security calculus-based on India's influence in Afganistan-however, treats Afghan Taliban as leverage and Pakistani Taliban as enemies of the state. Consequently, Afghan Taliban provide asylum in Pakistan while they wreak havoc in Afghanistan, and Pakistani Taliban are attacked. While Pakistan has countered and fomented numerous insurgencies, this is the first time that it has done both to achieve its national security goals. This dual policy and disconnect between American and Pakistanit threat perceptions is at the heart of Pakistan's security paradox. Pakistan continues to indirectly counter (COIN) and foment (FOIN) insurgency in Afghanistan. Without acknowledging, explicating, and eventually changing this paradox. Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to descent into chaos.

"December 2009"--P. [1] of cover.

Examining Pakistan's policies to counter and foment insurgencies -- Pakistan: COIN and FOIN theory and Praxis in brief (1948 to 2001) -- The COIN-FOIN paradox (2002 to 2008): from COIN to FOIN and back -- Policy guidelines: new realities, new policies -- Appendix A: terrorist attacks on U.S./Western targets in Pakistan 2001 to 2008 -- Appendix B: Pakistan, selected timeline 2000 to 2008.