In the contemporary operation environment symbolic information wins can precipitate strategic effects equivalent to, or greater than, lethal operations. New adversaries understand the power of "information effects." They realize that new media have leveled the playing field between state and non-state actors in the area of strategic communication. Anyone with access to a digital camera and the Internet can be an infowarrior and reach a global audience. In recent wars, new adversaries-exploiting new media capabilities and an information-led warfighting strategy-have proven capable of denying victory to stronger conventional military forces. In recognition of the challenge that new media represents, the U.S. Army War College hosted a two-day workshop that brought together leading practitioners from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Intelligence Community and academia. Participants considered the manifold ways that new media and the global information environment are changing the geo-strategic calculus for warfighting: How are adversaries leveraging new media for strategic wins? What are the institution, organization and cultural barriers that compromise or unduly restrict DoD's agility on this playing field? What does the age of "radical transparency" mean for Operations Security? Does the shift of capabilities to address multiple and hybrid threats take sufficient account of the need to transform DoD's approach to the informational battlespace? Participants concurred that the informational terrain is an integral component of today's operation environment. Warfighters need to be able to use all the means at their disposal to achieve the desired endstate, "Whether that is firing a tank round, or pushing a button to deliver the 'blue screen of death.'" DoD needs to plan for combat against opponents employing an information-led war fighting strategy, who are adept in the tactical use of new media. This requires a paradigm shift away from an emphasis on information control and toward information engagement. It will require cultural and organizational change as DoD navigates the world of digital natives-which includes both its own Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, as well as its media-agile adversaries. Most of all, it will force the sustained adaptation and evolution of the way the U.S. military thinks and fights.

Executive summary -- Introduction / Part I. From information control to engagement: winning in the new media battlespace. What "information engagement" means / Part II. Leveraging and countering new media: six requirements (SAMMMS). Speed: first past the post sticks -- Authorities powered down: agility requires it -- Message: specific, consistent, persistent -- Media: if you aren't in their space, you're no place -- Messengers: trusted by audience -- Soldiers telling their stories: informing the home front -- Official and embedded bloggers -- Citizen bloggers: the misinformed, not-so-friendly and independently friendlies -- Third party validators: credible and specific -- Synchronicity: essential for coherence and credibility / Part III. Countering the new media: special considerations. Countering adversary propaganda: plan, be proactive, be frank -- new media as self-healing and viral: "the kinetic response no longer works" -- Physical destruction can incur negative 2nd and 3rd order effects -- Physical attack can be essential for operational success -- Network attacks: a palate of options, but complex legalities -- Holistic approach / Part IV. Operations security (OPSEC) in the age of radical transparency. Internal challenges: the expectations and culture of deployed digital natives -- External challenges: the need to better define critical information -- Speed versus OPSEC conundrum -- Planning, red-teaming and a more sophisticated risk calculus -- Leveraging new media to enhance OPSEC: reducing footprints, OSINT and deception / Part V. Seizing the new media offensive: priority issues / Appendix: new media and information effects during the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon. Case study 1: operations security (OPSEC) and new media -- Case study 2: leveraging new media effects -- Case study 3: countering new media.