Clausewitz posited centuries ago that "no one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." Centuries later Robert Mandel cautioned that "perhaps the least understood, and certainly the least studied, aspect of war is how they end." Most recently, in "Learning to Leave," however, R. Greg Brown has taken a historical and theoretical examination of US national military strategy and examined the two theses to cogently highlight how misconceptions about our outdated security framework hinder disengagement. For example, he finds especially outdated and appalling the nexus between the national security strategy and the national military strategy and outlines their role in extending military engagements.

At head of title: "Air University Air Force Research Institute"--T.p. "May 2008"--T.p.

Introduction -- Disengagement in strategy -- Disengagement in the Cold War -- Disengagement in the new world order -- Reframing disengagement -- Effects of barriers -- Conclusion.