The Korean War provided the first wartime test for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as part of the machinery set up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment. In this capacity, they provided strategic direction to the United Nations (UN) forces in the field and were the agency by which President Truman exercised overall control of war strategy. When the focus shifted from combat to armistice negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to play an active role. They participated in all the key decisions taken during negotiations, and they provided the channel of communications between the Government in Washington and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and his armistice negotiating team in Korea. The focus of this volume is, naturally, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as they were not acting in a vacuum, it has been necessary to describe the context in which they functioned. To this end, the actions of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning overall military strategy and armistice negotiations have been described in some detail. In addition, the consequences of these actions, on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, have been sketched in broad outline. .

Korea in US policy, 1945-1950 -- The attack and the response -- The United States and the United Nations -- The buildup and the strategy -- The conflict almost won -- A time of uncertainty -- The new war -- The UN command in the balance -- The conflict stabilized -- The relief of General MacArthur -- Appendix I: General MacArthur's message of 30 June 1950 -- Appendix II: records of the Wake Island Conference -- Appendix III: the JCS-MacArthur relationship -- Appendix IV: list of abbreviations and acronyms --Appendix V: list of principal military and civilian officers.