Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. They reveal that it is a misconception that overall strategies radiate solely from political leaders. Instead, military officers at an operational level can achieve change as General McChrystal did for Afghanistan in 2009. The authors conclude that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations without the political support for these bottom-up initiatives.

From Strategy to Operations : or the Other Way Around?; H.Edstrom & D.Gyllensporre -- Painting the Theoretical Landscape; H.Edstrom & D.Gyllensporre -- The Development of a NATO Strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina; K.Larsdotter -- NATO's Operation Allied Force: Strategic Concepts and Institutional Relationships; R.C.Hendrickson -- Cooperating with the European Union in Europe: Policy or Strategy?; H.Edstrom -- The Forgotten Dimension?: NATO and the Security of the Member States; M. Petersson -- The Evolution of NATO's Strategy in Afghanistan; B.Schreer -- NATO Engagements in Africa: is There a Strategy for the Continent?; D.Gyllensporre.