First published in 1989, this title explores the nature and dimensions of the U.S. strategy in the Gulf in the formative years that followed the fall of the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. It describes the formation of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and the U.S. Central Command, their force structure and the network of U.S. bases and facilities in the region. The role of pro-Western countries in the wider region, in particular Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, in the formulation of strategy is discussed in detail, along with a m.

Description based upon print version of record.

Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Original Title Page; Original Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Tables and Maps; List of Acronyms; Dedication; Acknowledgements; Preface; 1. Evolution of U.S. Interests and Objectives; Oil, containment, and stability; After the Raj: an area of 'vital' interests; Notes; 2. The Shah and the Nixon Doctrine; The Nixon Doctrine; Oil and the 'twin pillars'; The Shah as regional policeman; The arms pipeline; Notes; 3. From Teheran to Kabul, 1979: Gulf Crises and American Reassertion; Iran and regional stability. The Afghanistan crisis and the Soviet 'threat'The Carter Doctrine; Notes; 4. The Central Command; From RDJTF to CENTCOM; Force structure; Strategic mobility programs; Notes; 5. Bases, 'Facility Access', and Geopolitics; The access network; Diego Garcia; Somalia; Kenya; Egypt; Israel; The Gulf Cooperation Council States; Notes; 6. Threats, Contingency Planning, and Response; 'Non-Soviet' threats; Response to the Gulf War: 1980-84; Arms sales; 'Third-party' assistance; The 'worst-case' threat; The preemptive strategy; The power projection balance; Escalation: nuclear or horizontal?; Notes 7. ConclusionBibliography; Index