Military command liability for grave breaches of national and international law : absolute or limited?
Microfilm
Military command liability for grave breaches of national and international law : absolute or limited?
Copies
2 Total copies, 2 Copies are in, 0 Copies are out.
During the intervening years since the My Lai massacre of March 16, 1968, a concept that would hold military commander absolutely liable for the actions of their subordinates has been expounded upon by several highly respected legal scholars who advance certain arguments and evidence from the Nuremberg war crimes trials and the trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. The concept has received a wide intellectual and public acceptance due to the skill with which it has been put forward, the credentials of its proponents, popular opposition to the war in Vietnam, and the basic unfamiliarity of most people with the principle elements of modern criminal law. The results of the official My Lai investigations and court martials, on the other hand, make it obvious that the United States government adheres to a concept of limited liability; however, no satisfactory official or unofficial explanation of the limited concept or of the actions that have resulted from it have been advanced in the public domain. The absence of credible rejoinders has given birth to a number of popular convictions, broadly states as follows: (1) that a criminal conspiracy exists to shield high-ranking American military commanders from liability, (2) that United States military law follows a self-serving double standard, (3) that the United States is not committed to the principles of international law, particularly the rules of war, and (4) that the courts-martial is an inadequate forum for the trial of alleged war crimes. The conceptual dichotomy and convictions arising from it are seen by the author as dysfunctional to the long-range national interest in that they have injected an element of confusion into the perceptual environment of decision-makers and public alike which make it unlikely that rational decisions will be reached at a time when policies affecting the nation’s future defense capabilities are being formulated. This work is an attempt to contribute to a more rational decision-making environment through a resolution of the discordant elements.
  • Share It:
  • Pinterest