This study examines the establishment and development of British Special Service forces - the commandos and airborne forces - from June 1940 to June 1941, with particular emphasis on the relationship between the role of these forces and the overall strategic policy. The problems arising from a lack of congruence between role and policy are enumerated, as well as the effects of the circumstantial influences of prior organizational interests and individual personalities. The tendency of special units to assume a life of their own, irrespective of rational requirements, is also addressed. This study is intended to provide a historical basis, with appropriate caveats, for the contemporary decision-maker in dealing with the establishment and direction of special- purpose units. It is applicable in the current issues of the operational requirements for long range surveillance operations units and the interrelationship of counter-terrorist, Special Forces, ranger, and security assistance organizations.

Thesis dated 6 June 1980. Also available as: AD/A 094 849.