"The deficiencies noted in these operations and the lessons learned will be correlated with present training cycles to derive the maximum benefit from combat experiences in Korea. It must be remembered that the observations contained in this document arose from the special conditions encountered in Korea and are not necessarily applicable to operations in other theaters or under other circumstances."--Page 1.

General --Reference -- Purpose -- Application -- Classification -- Personnel -- Non-battle casualties -- Foot-gear -- Replacements -- Supply -- Supply discipline -- Supplying forward elements -- Combined arms -- Tank-infantry training -- Company officer training -- Tank gunnery -- Communications -- Hand holds on tanks -- De-icing floating bridges -- Armor and infantry with motor convoys -- Infantry-artillery-armor-AAA team tactics -- Air Force support in a withdrawal -- Armor-infantry rescue mission -- Problems of armor-infantry teams -- Armor-infantry-artillery task force on exploitation -- Operations -- Anti-infiltration measures -- Anti-guerrilla measures (consolidation) -- Close combat -- Artillery operations under adverse conditions -- CCF operations in Korea against X Corps -- Withdrawal from Hungnam -- Evacuation of X Corps from North Korea -- CCF activities -- Mines and booby traps -- Mine laying and detecting procedures -- Dummy installations -- Antitank defense -- Use of musical instruments in battle -- Infiltration tactics -- Identification -- Notes on Chinese tactics -- Patrolling -- Lessons learned -- Pulsating patrolling theory -- Evasion and survival experiences -- Regimental patrol activities -- Unsuccessful patrol actions.