One of the recurring criticisms of the British Army's initial deployment to Northern Ireland was the nature of its doctrine. The argument stands that the doctrine of the British Army at the time was 'colonial', 'aggressive' and 'repressive', was forged from the retreat from empire and had failed to incorporate the lessons from the small wars of the inter-war period (1919–1939) and the various counterinsurgency campaigns that followed the end of World War Two. What little doctrine existed was largely irrelevant to the complex mission set Northern Ireland required, and "colonial era" generals applied the same approach to the deployment as they had in policing the colonies. The important question is; how fair is this? The assertion that the British Army deployed on the streets of Northern Ireland in August 1969 intellectually and mentally unprepared for the task they faced requires further exploration. What doctrine was in use, both contemporary and adversarial, formal and informal, when the British Army deployed in August 1969? What was the culture and attitude toward doctrine at the time? Was it read, applied, and understood? Researchers have not addressed these questions satisfactorily. This thesis will attempt to fill the gaps in knowledge.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited -- Report documentation page. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.) -- Thesis approval page. 15 June 2018 -- Thesis approval page.

Master of Military Art and Science thesis approval page --Abstract -- Acknowledgements -- Table of contents -- Acronyms -- Introduction -- Literature review -- Chapter 1. The initial deployment -- Chapter 2. The state of British counterinsurgency in 1969 -- Defining the Problem -- The rule of law -- Minimum force -- Hearts and minds -- Civil-military relationship -- Working with indigenous police -- Chapter 3. Available British doctrine -- Chapter 4. The British approach to doctrine -- Chapter 5. The challenge of “operationalizing” doctrine -- The rule of law -- Minimum force -- Hearts and minds? -- Civil-military relationship -- Working with the RUC -- Chapter 6. Energizing an insurgency -- Chapter 7. Conclusion -- Bibliography.