George Washington could criticize the militia in the sharpest, most condemning terms, but, as Mark Kwasny argues, the general also embraced a strategy that depended on the effectiveness of the militia. Its contributions were especially significant in the middle states around New York City. Militia units controlled local populations while defending coastal towns and enclaves against British raids. They cooperated effectively with the Continental Army, gathering military intelligence, serving as a defensive screen, and at critical times reinforcing the main army. Washington encouraged the use of the militia as partisans. The combination of 18th-century military doctrine and the partisan dimension reveals in Washington a depth of strategic ability only rarely recognized. By combining the histories of regular units, state militia, and politics at the state and national levels, the author brings clarity to the chaotic and complicated military campaigns. He aptly compares events in the middle states to the better known partisan warfare in the South and thus illuminates the militia's contributions to Washington's victories in the Revolutionary War.

Initial plans and preparations for the use of the militia, 1775-1776 -- Early defense of the Middle Colonies, 1775-1776 -- The armies arrive at New York, March-August 1776 -- New York lost and New Jersey saved, August 1776-January 1777 -- Partisan war erupts, January-May 1777 -- The militia takes over the defenses, May-December 1777 -- The Militia in a changing war, 1778 -- Frustration and partisan fighting, 1778-1779 -- Lost opportunities, 1780 -- The militia helps seize an opportunity, 1781 -- The final years, 1782-1783 -- Conclusion.

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