Using a broad array of sources, including interviews with top-level U.S. officials at every level of the war effort, Barzilai concludes that the failure to kill bin Laden and destroy al Qaeda at the Battle of Tora Bora was not only the result of a failure in tactics but, more importantly, the product of failures in policy and leadership.

Cover; Contents; List of Maps; Author's Note; Foreword; Preface; Introduction; Abbreviations; 1 The Lion's Den; 2 Scrambling to Respond; 3 Preparing for War; 4 A Slow Start; 5 The Strategic Void; 6 Dominoes; 7 Distractions; 8 A Battle Won and a War Lost; Conclusion; Epilogue; Acknowledgments; Sources and Methodology; Notes; Selected Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y; Z; About the Author.

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