This thesis began with a simple question: How was the US Army successful in OIF? This thesis begins by placing the study of military history as the centerpiece of officer education and development, particular for future commanders of forces in the field. It then examines doctrine in the US Army experience since the mid-1970s that began with men such as General William DePuy, and the tension it brought to officer development. The thesis then goes on to examine operational art in US Army doctrine and counterinsurgency (COIN), and investigate, in depth, the writing and thinking of a senior military officer with significant experience in countering insurgency as well a high command of conventionally-trained forces. In chapter four, there is a review of the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom, to shape the context of what follows, and how the war appeared in many facets a problem of management. In chapter five, the author identifies general ideas concerning how leaders and organizations learned and adapted while fighting in OIF, particularly concerning command leadership traits that may predispose an organization to learning and adapting. The final chapter examines the critical linkage between the study of military history, command leadership, and the potential for operational art and thinking.

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