In this two-part interview, Major Joe O'Neil discusses his service as the executive officer (XO) for the 2nd Military Intelligence Battalion, 66th Military Intelligence Group at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, and Camp Cropper from January through December 2006 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The unit experienced significant difficulties in obtaining enough crew-served weapons, communications equipment and vehicles to effectively train prior to deployment. Originally slated to be the battalion's rear detachment commander, he found out he would deploy as the XO within 20 days of leaving. Upon arriving they received an excellent handoff, including training and information about local policies and local situations regarding the interrogation center they were taking over. Their immediate challenges consisted of developing a better system for document exploitation, unreliable equipment for recording interrogations, and generally inadequate facilities formed from cargo containers. As battalion XO, O'Neil found himself dealing with a wide variety tasks, including the handling of contractors and the escorting of guests, but his primary focus was coordination with Task Force 134 and planning for the unit's move to Camp Cropper. While the new accommodations at Camp Cropper were better, they were a mile distant from the facilities separated by bad roads, and in poor weather it was major problem moving soldiers between the two. He notes that he enjoyed the learning aspect of deploying to Iraq, facing something unique every day and taking a hand in developing a new interrogation facility. He also points out that the interrogation facility was a joint enterprise heavily assisted by the Air Force, but a lack of trust or understanding of the Army's different rating and disciplinary systems led to two chains of command and a good deal of friction. O'Neil says that most of the contractors working at the facility were there for the right reasons, stating, "The L3 and Titan folks who were doing interrogation and interpretation were good people." When it was time for them to leave, they conducted five video teleconferences with the replacing unit before they arrived to have eye-to-eye contact and impart important information to them. He explains that there was often a real separation between policy and practice, that doctrine and guidance would often change on a monthly basis, and that unit recommendations were not well integrated into new policy. O'Neil closes the interview by saying that the Joint Exploitation Center was aligned throughout theater and that document exploitation was efficiently streamlined through their efforts.

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