As an infantry officer in the 82nd Airborne Division from 2002-2006, Major Keller Durkin participated in three different deployments and describes them in three separate interviews. In the wake of the attack on the World Trade Center, he participated in the establishment of the Operation Noble Eagle Strategic Reaction Force. Durkin deployed to OEF III as the battalion S4 of 3-504 PIR in January 2003 and redeployed at the end of that same year. He took command of A/3-504 PIR on 22 May 2003 and participated in many quick reaction force missions in the Khowst Bowl region. After Afghanistan, Durkin's unit received short notice orders for Iraq that straddled OIF I and II. In Iraq, he conducted force protection missions around Balad Air Base from January to April 2004. His time in Iraq encompassed the Sadr uprising and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) training. As the environment became more dangerous, his unit had to implement crucial force protection measures and liaise with several National Guard units that were in the process of adapting to the environment. At one point, a sniper took a shot at him and the base received so much indirect fire that it became known as "Mortar-itaville." Following the deployment to Iraq, Durkin returned to Afghanistan with the 82nd Airborne Division during OEF VI. Deploying on 17 May 2005, he served in numerous staff jobs during this deployment, including 1BCT LNO to CJTF-76, LNO to coalition forces during Operation Redwings, chief of operations for 1BCT, and G3 Air of the 82nd Airborne Division, among other duties. In his capacity as an LNO, he observed several unity of command problems between the SEALs, USMC and SOF forces. He felt that bureaucracy and classification issues prevented them from properly integrating their capabilities and severely inhibited CJTF-76's performance in the Korengal Valley. His experience working with the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) showed that their performance primarily reflected that of the unit that they were partnered with. Last, he discussed the evolution and effectiveness of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), concluding that the failure of the military to integrate with officials from the Department of State undermined their performance. Durkin redeployed from Afghanistan in March 2006.

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